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Abstract and Keywords
Industry-level productivity analysis can be a useful diagnostic tool to better understand 
why some countries show faster overall productivity growth and to direct research 
attention to parts of the economy that warrant more detailed scrutiny. This chapter 
illustrates these strengths in three applications, namely the Europe-US productivity 
growth gap since the mid-1990s, the sectoral sources of rapid convergence of 
productivity levels between advanced and emerging economies, and an analysis of the 
determinants of productivity growth and convergence. One conclusion is that a better 
understanding of productivity growth (or lack thereof) in services industries should still 
be an important goal of researchers aiming to understand cross-country growth 
differences.
Keywords: industry, productivity, Europe, economy, productivity analysis
22.1. Introduction
THE analysis of productivity at the industry level stands at the midway point between 
economy-wide and firm-level analyses. On the firm-level end of the spectrum, the survey 
by Syverson (2011) on “what determines productivity” is devoted to studies of the role of, 
for instance, management practices, competition, trade, innovation, and resource 
allocation, which are addressed most convincingly at the firm level. On the economy-wide 
end of the spectrum, aggregate productivity can shed light on, for instance, the sources 
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of growth (Fernald and Jones 2014) or cross-country income differences (Caselli 2005). 
So what role is there for an industry perspective?
I would argue that a particular advantage of the industry level over the firm level is that it 
can deliver a more comprehensive and an international comparative perspective. In other 
words, a main advantage of industry-level analysis over firm-level analysis is that data 
can be drawn from National Accounts—which are publicly available—and that the output 
of all industries together add up to gross domestic product (GDP). In contrast, in firm-
level studies, the manufacturing sector is heavily overrepresented, which limits the extent 
to which outcomes can be generalized.  Similarly, high-quality firm-level data, which 
cover a comprehensive set of firms and can be used to trace entry and exit, are typically 
confidential and cannot be easily used in an international comparative perspective.
Another challenge at the firm level is that, for almost any analysis, important pieces of 
information are not available at that level of detail. For instance, an industrial survey may 
provide information on firm revenues, but not on the prices charged (Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Syverson 2008). Similarly, information about the skill level of employees is also 
typically collected through household, rather than enterprise surveys.  Industry 
identifiers, though, are usually part of all such surveys, which means that industry-level 
analysis can typically draw on a greater variety of data items.
Economy-wide analysis likewise has important shortcomings, which are best illustrated 
with the debate about the acceleration of US productivity growth, starting in 1995 and 
the comparison with Europe.  In the United States, the debate was between Jorgenson 
and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000), who argued that there had been a 
substantial change in the US productivity growth pattern, while Gordon (2000) argued 
that the increase in productivity growth was highly localized in information technology 
(IT) production. This was not resolved until the more detailed work of Jorgenson, Ho, and 
Stiroh (2005) showed that increases in productivity growth were also apparent in many 
industries that used information and communications technology (ICT) intensively.
Similarly, when comparing Europe and the United States, Timmer and van Ark (2005)
showed that the EU-US growth gap could be explained by differences in the importance 
of the IT production sector, while van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer (2008) could later show 
that this aggregate picture concealed a large difference in productivity growth in the 
(ICT-intensive) market services.
This is not to say that industry-level analysis is without shortcomings. Just as economy-
wide data can conceal important industry-level differences, so can industry data obscure 
differences in productivity across firms, as Chapter 18 of this Handbook illustrates. 
Another problem is measurement of industry output. One reason why many firm-level 
studies focus on manufacturing is that their production process is understood more 
clearly than that of many services, and we can more easily measure the price of their 
output. In services, more careful modeling and surveying are typically needed, and 
progress in this area is highly uneven across countries and industries.  Finally, in a 
globalizing world where different stages of production are fragmented across borders, 







The Industry Sources of Productivity Growth and Convergence
Page 3 of 37
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 12 September 2018
may engage in very different activities in different countries. For example, the electronics 
industry in the United States will include design of the iPhone, while the same industry in 
China focuses on assembly of the iPhone. A more in-depth discussion of this problem is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but is taken up in Chapter 21 of this volume.
This discussion suggests that the analysis of productivity at the industry level should be 
done where its strengths are greatest or the weaknesses of the alternatives make it the 
best choice. In the remainder of this chapter, I will present three examples of such 
applications. First, I will analyze the industry sources of transatlantic productivity growth 
differences, to examine whether the findings of van Ark et al. (2008) still hold in the face 
of data revisions and the more turbulent macroeconomic backdrop of the financial crisis. 
Second, for a broader set of countries, I will trace the industry origins of changes in 
aggregate cross-country productivity dispersion. One important question is whether the 
manufacturing sector is somehow special as a source of convergence, as suggested by the 
work of Rodrik (2013). Third, I examine to what extent the varied patterns of industry 
productivity growth and convergence can be explained using factors that play a 
role in determining productivity. This extends the analysis of Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark 
(2008) and McMorrow, Röger, and Turrini (2010) to a broader set of countries and a more 
recent period.
22.2. The Transatlantic Productivity Growth 
Gap
The growth experience of Europe relative to the United States since World War II can be 
characterized in two phases, namely a rapid convergence in GDP per hour worked from 
1950 until the mid-1990s, followed by a period of divergence. Figure 22.1 illustrates this 
by plotting GDP per hour worked for the EU-15 (i.e., the 15 member-states of the 
European Union until 2004), relative to the United States. Also shown in the chart is GDP 
per capita, which has been fairly stable in relative terms since the early 1970s. The 
difference between the evolution in GDP per hour and GDP per capita is due to 
differences in hours worked per capita, which in general will reflect differences in labor 
market outcomes and different preferences for leisure.
(p. 727) 
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The relative decline in 
GDP per hour worked is 
substantial: after peaking 
at 87% in 1995, the level 
in 2013 stood at only 78%, 
a relative level comparable 
to the early 1980s. This 
relative decline has been 
fairly constant over this 
18-year period, suggesting 
a persistent 
source of growth 
differences. Moreover, the 
relative decline has been 
widespread across the 
EU-15: 13 of the 15 
countries had a lower level 
of GDP per hour worked 
relative to the United 
States in 2013 than in 
1995 (the exceptions were Ireland and Sweden).
At this economy-wide level of analysis, we can go one step further and assess whether 
differences in growth of GDP per hour worked are due to differences in the growth 
contribution from other inputs. For this, we rely on the growth accounting decomposition 
provided in the Total Economy Database of The Conference Board:
(22.1)
where Y is GDP in country i at t, α is the share of labor income in GDP, the upper-bar 
denotes a two-period average, L is labor input, K is capital input, and A is total factor 
productivity (TFP). The labor input index is based on data on hours worked by workers 
with different levels of educational attainment, giving greater weight to workers that earn 
higher wages and thus (are assumed to) have a higher marginal product. Similarly, the 
index for capital input is based on data for different capital assets, notably ICT assets and 
non-ICT assets—buildings, transport equipment, and other machinery. Here, too, the 
assumption is made that assets with higher marginal costs—like ICT assets, which 
depreciate rapidly and show falling prices over time—have higher marginal products. As 
detailed in Jorgenson (2005) and Hulten (2010), equating marginal products to marginal 
costs means assuming that firms are cost-minimizing price-takers in factor markets. 
Furthermore, under the assumption of perfect competition in output markets, income 
shares equal output elasticities.
Click to view larger
Figure 22.1  GDP per hour worked and GDP per 
capita in the EU-15 relative to the United States, 
1950–2013.
Notes: EU-15 refers to the 15 member countries of 
the European Union until 2004: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom.
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy 
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To relate the growth accounting decomposition to the pattern in Figure 22.1, equation 
(22.1) can be rewritten in terms of labor productivity:
(22.2)
where H is the total number of hours worked. From this equation, we can see that 
differences in labor productivity growth may be accounted for by differences in the pace 
of change in labor composition, , differences in the rate of capital deepening, 
, or differences in TFP growth, .
Figure 22.2 shows the development of TFP in the EU-15 and the United States since 
1990, indexed to 1995 = 1. As the figure shows, TFP has grown by more than 10% in the 
United States over the period since 1995, while EU TFP was barely higher in 2013 than in 
1995. In other words, the decline in Europe’s relative labor productivity level from Figure
22.1 can be fully accounted for by lower TFP growth in Europe than in the United States. 
Indeed, the correlation between the relative changes in labor productivity and the 
relative changes in TFP is close to one. But what this actually says is that we do not really 
know what is behind the difference in labor productivity growth, since differences in the 
pace of change in labor composition or differences in capital deepening have no (overall) 
explanatory power. For individual countries within the EU-15, the TFP growth pattern is 
more mixed than the labor productivity growth pattern—with Austria, Finland, and 
Germany showing similar TFP growth as the United States, and Ireland and 
Sweden showing somewhat faster growth—but the United States has a clear growth 
advantage over the other 10 EU countries.
To advance our 
understanding of these 
growth differences, we 
turn to an industry-level 
breakdown of total 
economy TFP growth. 
Note that this should be 
seen more as a diagnostic 
than an explanatory 
device: merely comparing 
growth in specific 
industries or groups of 
industries will not reveal 
why growth is faster. 
However, it can be helpful 
in suggesting where to 
look. For instance, if the 
United States has a TFP 
growth advantage in 
Click to view larger
Figure 22.2  Total factor productivity in the EU-15 
and United States, 1989–2013 (1995 = 1).
Notes: EU-15 refers to the 15 member countries of 
the European Union until 2004: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy 
Database™, January 2014, http://www.tcb.org/data/
economydatabase/.
(p. 729) 
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industries that use ICT intensively, then the more specific question becomes why US firms 
are able to better use this technology to increase their productivity, for instance through 
better “people management” practices (Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen 2012).
It is not straightforward, though, to gain a detailed industry perspective, as it requires 
not only the type of information that is regularly found in country National Accounts, on 
the value added, investments, and total employment of industries, but also data on the 
skill composition of the workforce and the asset composition of investment. Though 
collecting such data is feasible for numerous countries,  it is much harder to achieve 
comprehensive and up-to-date country coverage. For the analysis here, I use the 2012 
version of the EU KLEMS database,  which includes data for the United States and for 
10 of the EU-15 countries (representing 93% of EU-15 GDP), and covers the period 
through 2009 for all countries. Industry TFP growth is computed using an analogous 
growth accounting approach, as in equation (22.1), so industry TFP growth is equal to 
growth in industry value added minus cost-share-weighted growth of industry labor 
input and capital input. A helpful consequence of this is that we can decompose 
overall TFP growth into contributions by industries or groups of industries with 
comparable features. Specifically, aggregate TFP growth can be written as
(22.3)
where  is the growth of TFP in industry j (in country i at time t) and v is the value-
added share of industry j,  with V denoting value added at current prices and 
the upper bar indicating a two-period average. The same equation can be used to 
compute TFP growth for groups of industries.
Table 22.1 compares the TFP growth experience of the EU-10 and the United States 
between 1995 and 2009 for major industry groups. Note that, as Figure 22.2 shows, using 
2009 as the final year of the comparison (a necessity given the coverage of EU KLEMS) is 
relatively flattering, as a larger growth gap has opened up in more recent years. In 
addition to average growth, the table shows the average value-added share of each group 
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Table 22.1 The Industry Composition of TFP Growth in the EU-10 and the United States, Average 1995–2009 (in %)
TFP Growth Share Contribution
EU-10 US EU-10 US EU-10 US
Total economy 0.0 0.3 100 100
Market 
economy
0.3 0.6 59 67 0.3 0.6
    ICT 
production




0.2 –0.4 21 20 0.1 –0.1
Market 
services
–0.3 0.2 31 40 –0.1 0.1
    Distribution 
and trade




–0.8 –0.5 12 18 –0.2 –0.1
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    Personal 
services
–0.7 –0.9 4 6 –0.1 –0.1
Notes: EU-10 incudes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The 
share is the share in total economy value added. The growth contributions in the final columns are computed using equation (22.3). 
ICT production includes electronics manufacturing and information and communication services. Goods-producing industries include 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing (excluding electronics), utilities, and construction. The market economy includes all industries 
except government, health, education, for which output measurement is more challenging and likely more heterogeneous across 
countries, and real estate, for which output growth is equal to input growth for much of the industry.
Sources: Computations based on EU KLEMS database; see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) and www.euklems.net.
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Table 22.1 shows that the growth differential between the EU-10 and the United 
States for the market economy matches the growth differential for the total economy over 
the 1995–2009 period, with US TFP growing at twice the rate of the EU-10. The 
subsequent rows replicate the industry breakdown of van Ark et al. (2008): the 
production of ICT goods and services, goods-producing industries, and market services. 
Market services, in turn, are further split into distribution and trade industries, finance 
and business services, and personal services. The final two columns, which show the 
contribution of each industry grouping to market economy TFP growth, shows that the 
contributions from ICT production exactly match the aggregate growth. In other words, 
the net contribution of all industries other than ICT production is zero. Furthermore, the 
larger contribution from ICT production in the United States can be traced to faster TFP 
growth, not a larger ICT sector.
Despite a net difference of zero, the table does point to some similarities and differences 
compared with earlier analyses. Most important, TFP growth in goods-producing 
industries in the EU-10 is positive, while TFP declined in the United States. This can 
mostly be traced to TFP declines in construction, but also to slower TFP growth in 
manufacturing outside ICT production. Conversely, the United States had a clear TFP 
growth advantage in market services, mostly because of faster TFP growth in distribution 
and trade. This has often been linked to the intensity with which this sector uses ICT, as 
in Stiroh (2002) and Jorgenson et al. (2005). However, the fact that finance and business 
services show an overall negative contribution, despite ICT-use being most intensive in 
that sector, suggests the limitations of that view. Furthermore, the earlier focus on 
growth differences in market services (e.g., Inklaar et al. 2008) still seems relevant with 
today’s numbers, but some of the US productivity growth advantage in this sector has 
disappeared over time. In part, this is due to the period chosen, with the earlier analysis 
based on data for the 1995–2004 period. But data revisions play an important role as 
well: in Inklaar et al. (2008), US TFP growth in market services was an annual average of 
1.3%, but based on the current vintage of productivity data, growth only averaged 0.8% 
between 1995 and 2004.
(p. 731) 
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22.2.1. Summing Up
This section on the transatlantic productivity growth gap has illustrated some of the 
strengths, but also the limitations of industry-level analysis for the diagnosis of aggregate 
growth differences. When specific industries are particularly dynamic, which has clearly 
been the case for the ICT production sector, it is important to isolate its role from that of 
other industries. Ever since the early studies of the US productivity growth resurgence 
(e.g., Gordon 2000; Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000; Oliner and Sichel 2000), it has been clear 
that the ICT sector has played a notable role, and it has also long been clear that the 
growth benefits from this sector have been smaller in Europe (Timmer et al. 2010). Some 
of the other diagnoses have been subject to greater variability over time, though. The role 
of ICT use seemed at one point to be quite important, suggesting possible 
productivity spillovers from this technology. But the fact that in finance and business 
services, among the most ICT-intensive industries of the economy, US TFP growth has 
been revised from strongly positive to clearly negative suggests that caution is in order.
This is even more pressing when making international growth comparisons, since price 
and volume measurement practices differ considerably across countries (Inklaar et al. 
2008).
22.3. The Industry Sources of Convergence
Recent literature has focused on the role of industry productivity in shaping cross-country 
income differences and the importance of structural change for aggregate outcomes.
However, most studies in this area give a comprehensive coverage of industries only for 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. This begs 
the question of whether rich-country results are applicable to emerging economies as 
well. Alternatively, studies covers a wide range of countries, but only for a specific sector 
of the economy, such as agriculture or manufacturing.  This begs the question of 
whether a specific sector truly plays an exceptional role in explaining cross-country 
differences in economic performance. In particular, the recent work of Rodrik (2013)
suggests that productivity in manufacturing converges across countries, regardless of 
country factors (i.e., unconditional convergence). In this section, I will give a 
comprehensive accounting of changes in market economy productivity dispersion into the 
role of several major sectors of the economy for 38 economies that span much of the 
development spectrum.
22.3.1. Methodology
The crucial input for the analysis of convergence consists of estimates of relative industry 
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growth over time and productivity levels across countries, there are sufficient differences 
in methodology and data to warrant further discussion. Here I give an overview, drawing 
on the more detailed exposition in Inklaar and Diewert (2016).
To analyze the degree of convergence toward the productivity frontier, it is necessary to 
measure output and input levels that are comparable across countries and over time. It is 
also useful to have measures that are invariant to the choice of a reference point—that is, 
a single country and year that act as a basis for comparison for all other countries and 
years. Finally, it is useful to have a methodology that is based on an economic approach to 
production theory. Such an approach was developed by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert 
(1982a) (hereafter CCD), but their approach has a significant limitation. Their 
approach relies on the distance function methodology for aggregating inputs and outputs 
that can be traced back to Malmquist (1953), which they further developed (CCD 1982a). 
The problem is that this distance function methodology does not allow us to compare real 
GDP or real value added across countries, as that methodology requires a strict 
separation of outputs and inputs. Net output aggregates based on distance function 
techniques do not work if the output aggregate includes intermediate inputs or imports. 
In this section, we show how this problem can be addressed in a production theory 
framework by using the methodology that was developed by Diewert and Morrison 
(1986), drawing also on the techniques used by CCD.
We give a brief explanation of the methodology developed by Diewert and Morrison 
(1986) for a comparison of real outputs, inputs, and productivity levels across two time 
periods or two production units in the same industry. Consider a set of production units 
that produce a vector of  net outputs,  , using a non-negative vector of 
primary inputs, . Let the feasible set of net outputs and primary inputs for 
production unit  be denoted by  for . It is assumed that each  is a closed 
convex cone in  so that production is subject to constant returns to scale for each 
production unit. For each strictly positive net-output price vector  and 
each strictly positive primary-input vector , define the value added function or GDP 
function for production unit , , as follows:
(22.4)
These value-added functions  provide a dual representation of the technology sets 
under our assumptions on the technology sets. Finally, Diewert and Morrison assume 
specific functional forms for the value-added functions  defined by (22.1): they assumed 
that each value-added function has a translog functional form. Armed with these 
assumptions, Diewert and Morrison (1986, 661–665) were able to construct output, input, 
and productivity levels between any two production units using the economic approach to 
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Given this starting, we can detail the methodology for comparing industry productivity 
level across countries and over time. We assume that there are four sets of basic data, 
each for  countries and  years. (i) The value of net output  in country 
 in domestic currency during period  is  for . Thus there are  net output 
commodities, and if , commodity  is used as an input by country  in period . (ii) 
The price or purchasing power parity (PPP, in domestic currency) for net output  in 
country  for time period  is . These output prices or PPPs are prices that use the 
same unit of measurement for the same commodity across countries. (iii) The value of 
primary input  in country  in domestic currency during period  is  for . 
(iv) The price or PPP (in domestic currency) for primary input  in country  for time 
period  is  for .
Given the preceding primary data sets, we can construct implicit output and 
input quantities for each country and each time period. Define the implicit quantity (or 
volume)  of net output as  and define the implicit quantity (or volume)  of 
primary inputs as . Define the total value added in domestic currency for 
country  in period , , and the total value of primary inputs for country  in period , , 
by summing over net outputs and inputs:
(22.5)
In what follows, we will make use of value-added output shares  and primary-
input cost shares 
Define the (strictly positive) net output price vector for country  in period  as 
 and the corresponding net output quantity vector as . 
Then under our assumptions on technology and behavior, Diewert and Morrison (1986, 
665) have showed that the aggregate price of real value added in country  in period 
relative to the aggregate price of real value added in country  in period , , is equal to 
the Törnqvist-Theil output price index ; that is,
(22.6)
Diewert and Morrison (1986, 665) also indicated that the corresponding implicit quantity 
index, , provides a good estimator of the ratio of real value added in country  in 
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Obviously, we could pick a country and a time period (say period 1 and country 1) and 
treat this production unit as a numeraire unit and measure the GDP output prices and 
quantities of other observations relative to this numeraire unit. This would lead to a 
sequence of aggregate prices, , and quantities, . However, we could just as easily 
pick country 2 in period 1 as the numeraire country, and this would lead to the sequence 
of country PPPs and real value added of  and . Unfortunately,  will not, in 
general, be proportional to  and  will not be proportional to ; that is, the 
results will depend on the choice of the numeraire country. CCD solved this numeraire 
dependence problem by averaging over all possible choices of the numeraire observation. 
Following this strategy, we use the Diewert-Morrison PPPs as the basic bilateral building 
blocks, rather than the CCD bilateral choice of index number formula, which did not allow 
for negative net outputs. Thus define the geometric mean of all the PPP parities for 
country k in time period t relative to all possible choices  of the base country,  as 
follows:
(22.8)
It is usually convenient to pick out the country with the largest economy (say 
country 1) in period 1 and form a set of normalized aggregate output PPPs that compare 
the PPPs defined by (22.9) or (22.11) to the PPP for country 1 in period 1. Thus we define 
our final set of value-added output deflators, , as follows:
(22.9)
The final set of real value-added estimates  that are comparable across time and space 
is defined by deflating each country’s nominal value added by the PPPs defined by 
(22.9):
(22.10)
We next turn our attention to the problems associated with measuring real primary input 
across countries. Define the (strictly positive) input quantity vector as 
and the corresponding input price vector as . Then under our 
assumptions on technology and behavior, Diewert and Morrison (1986, 665) showed that 
the aggregate quantity of primary input in country  in period  relative to the aggregate 
quantity of primary input in country  in period , , is equal to the Törnqvist-Theil input 
quantity index ; that is, we have
(p. 735) 
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(22.11)
As was the case with the construction of output aggregates, there are  different choices 
of a base country, and so we follow the same strategy of taking a geometric average of 
these alternative choices of a base observation. Thus define  as
(22.12)
We follow the same convention as on the output side to define a set of input-quantity 
aggregates,  relative to country 1 in year 1 as
(22.13)
Diewert and Morrison (1986, 663) showed that under their assumptions, a theoretical 
productivity index  between the production unit  at period  relative to the production 
unit  at period , , was equal to the output ratio  defined by (22.7) divided by the 
input ratio  defined by (22.11); that is, we have
(22.14)
As before, the bilateral productivity indexes defined by (22.14) are not transitive, and so 
they are made transitive by defining the ratio of the productivity of country k in period t to 
the geometric mean of all country TFP levels over all years, , as follows:
(22.15)
The  are analogs to the translog multilateral productivity indexes defined by CCD 
(1982a, 81). Again, for ease of interpretation, we replace the productivity levels defined 
by (11.22) by the following normalized productivity levels :
(22.16)
where  is defined by (22.10) and  is defined by (22.13); that is, the  normalized TFP 
levels, , defined by (22.16) are equal to the corresponding normalized output level 
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This completes the exposition of our methodology for making cross-country comparisons 
of output, input, and productivity using the economic approach to index number theory 
when the output aggregate contains intermediate inputs. To determine whether the 
degree to which productivity levels differ, it is useful to, first, consider how to measure 
the level of “world” productivity  in each time period . We define the world productivity 
level at time period  as the ratio of world output to world input, thus requiring a 
definition of world output and input. The multilateral output indexes,  defined by 
(22.10), are comparable across countries and time periods. Hence, it is meaningful to add 
them up to obtain aggregate measures of real output. Thus define world output, , as 
follows:
(22.17)
In a similar fashion, world input, , is defined as the sum of the multilateral input 
aggregates  defined by (22.13):
(22.18)
Define the country  share of world real input during period , , as
(22.19)
Finally, the level of world productivity, , is defined as the ratio of world output to input. 
It is then straightforward to show that  is equal to an input-share-weighted average of 
the multilateral productivity indexes  over all countries  for time period :
(22.20)
To assess the degree of convergence, I consider the dispersion of country productivity 
levels around world productivity levels. This is more commonly known as -convergence 
(see Lichtenberg 1994 and Barro 2015). This can be seen as the productivity 
counterpart to measures of cross-country income inequality (Milanovic 2012), showing to 
what extent productivity levels are becoming more similar over time. We define the 
following input-weighted measure of productivity dispersion as
21
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(22.21)
Note that  is the ratio of the productivity level of country  in period  to world average 
level of productivity in period . If all country productivity levels are the same in period , 
each  will be equal to  and  will be equal to 0; that is, there is complete productivity 
convergence.
22.3.2. Data
The approach to estimating industry productivity levels discussed in the previous section 
requires data on the input–output structure of each country over time and data on 
relative prices that can be used to infer relative industry output prices and input prices. 
For information on country input–output structures, I make use of the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD). This is a source of harmonized input–output tables, covering 35 
industries and 40 countries for the period 1995–2011. For our analysis, we omit 
Luxembourg and Indonesia due to data challenges. Still, the remaining 38 countries 
represent two-thirds of the world population and over 80% of world GDP and span much 
of the development spectrum, from India to the United States.
The construction and features of the WIOD are described in detail in Timmer, 
Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, and de Vries (2015). The WIOD is constructed based on 
national supply and use tables (SUTs), combined with time series data from country 
National Accounts to ensure consistency with trends in industry output and overall 
economic activity. Importantly for analysis of global value chains, the SUTs are combined 
with data on trade in goods and services. This way, it is possible to distinguish the 
composition of intermediate inputs not only in terms of what products are used, but also 
where these products are produced and, in many cases, imported from. For the purposes 
of this chapter, though, this level of detail is not necessary, as only a distinction between 
domestically produced and imported intermediate inputs (from any country) is needed. 
Still, the fact that much effort has gone into harmonizing the industrial classifications 
across countries makes the WIOD ideally suited for this type of cross-country analysis.
The input–output data from WIOD include the net output and factor input values, the 
and . We additionally need information on relative prices to allow for comparisons of 
output and factor inputs, that is, the  and . In part, these are drawn from the Socio-
Economic Accounts (SEA) of WIOD. These provide information on the labor compensation 
and number of hours worked by workers who are high-skilled, medium-skilled, 
and low-skilled (based on their level of education) as well as on capital stocks.
For computing prices of industry output (and hence domestically produced intermediate 
inputs), relative prices for consumption and investment are used. Consumption and 
investment prices are from the International Comparison Program (ICP), run by the 
World Bank, and we use the three surveys covering a global sample of countries that 
were done in the 1995–2011 period, namely for 1996, 2005, and 2011.  We use the most 
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investment categories to industries. Aggregating across expenditure categories is done 
using the CCD index. ICP prices are based on surveys of purchaser prices rather than 
producer prices, which means that differences in product taxes and distribution margins 
would lead to a bias in industry output prices. I therefore use tax and margin data from 
WIOD to adjust the ICP prices.  For years not covered by ICP survey data, we use 
industry deflators to interpolate (for, say, 2007) or extrapolate (e.g., 1995) relative prices, 
as in Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015).
For three of the services industries—government, health, and education—the ICP prices 
do not reflect the prices paid by purchasers of these services, since public provision or 
funding makes output prices hard or even impossible to observe. Instead, ICP aims to 
measure input prices (see Heston 2013). In our framework, this implies equal productivity 
levels across countries since relative “output” prices equal relative input prices. These 
industries are therefore excluded when analyzing productivity differences over time, just 
as they were in the previous section on growth differences. Similarly, the real estate 
industry is excluded, as (for the most part) its output is the imputed rental cost of owner-
occupied housing, and the “private households with employed persons” industry is 
excluded as its dominant (sometimes only) input is labor (as well as incomplete coverage 
across countries). The remaining set of 30 industries will be referred to as the market 
economy.
In contrast to other industries, there is direct data on producer prices in agriculture, from 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). These have been widely used in studying 
productivity in agriculture, typically based on the relative prices estimated by Rao 
(1993).  For this analysis, I collected prices and production quantities for crops and 
livestock directly from FAO and aggregated these to overall agriculture relative output 
prices for each year using the CCD index.
The relative price of capital—estimated using equation (22.8)—requires data on 
investment prices, for which ICP prices can be used directly. The required rate of return 
is taken as the lending rate, taken from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
International Financial Statistics; the depreciation rates are from Penn World Table 
version 8.1, which provides country-level average depreciation rates in each year; and the 
investment price change is from WIOD. One drawback is that relative investment prices 
cover only fixed reproducible assets, thus omitting land. This omission can be particularly 
relevant for agriculture, so I also computed relative productivity using the procedure of 
Vollrath (2009). The results for cross-country differences in agricultural productivity over 
time are qualitatively similar to those presented in the following.
22.3.3. Results
To frame the context of the sectorial analysis, Figure 22.3 presents the trend in market 
economy productivity dispersion across the set of 38 countries covered in the analysis. As 
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government, health and education, real estate, and households. Each country’s (log) 
productivity level is multiplied by the share of factor inputs to give greater weight to 
(e.g.) China and less to (e.g.) Cyprus; see equation (2.21). The figure shows a substantial 
and fairly steady decline in the standard deviation, so that in 2011 it is 37% lower than it 
was in 1995.
Aggregate convergence is also found if weighting is omitted (–21%). Furthermore, the 
38% decline in Figure 22.1 is both economically substantial and, using the T  test of 
Carree and Klomp (1997), statistically significant at the 10% level. Figure 22.3 also shows 
that the finding of convergence is a fairly continuous process, so the subsequent 
comparison will be done by comparing the dispersion in 2011 to that in 1995. Aggregate 
convergence is due in part to rapidly rising productivity levels in China (increasing from 
18% to 40% of the 1995 US level) and India (39% to 45%). However, big increases in 
productivity are also seen in Turkey (38% to 49%) and in Central and Eastern Europe, in 
countries like Estonia (27% to 39%) and Poland (30% to 64%).
To analyze the sectorial 
pattern of convergence 
and how these contribute 
to aggregate convergence, 
I split the market economy 
into a traded and non-
traded sector, where the 
traded sector encompasses 
agriculture, mining, and 
manufacturing, and the 
non-traded sector covers 
utilities, construction, and 
(market) services. 
Alternatively, I consider a 
split into the more 
traditional major sectors, 
distinguishing agriculture, 
manufacturing, market services (transport, distribution, communication, hotels 
and restaurants, finance and business services), and other goods (mining, utilities, and 
construction). Table 22.2 summarizes this analysis and shows that productivity 
convergence is driven primarily by convergence in the traded sector. The major sector 
distinction shows that manufacturing and other goods showed notable convergence, with 
smaller declines in dispersion in agriculture and, particularly, market services.
Click to view larger
Figure 22.3  Market economy productivity 
dispersion, 1995–2011.
Notes: Productivity dispersion is measured as the 
standard deviation of log productivity levels, 
weighted using the share of each country in global 
factor inputs. Market economy covers all industries 
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Table 22.2 Productivity Dispersion in 1995 and 2011 by Main Sectors
1995 2011 % Change
Market economy 0.709 0.448 –37
    Traded sector 1.144 0.871 –24
    Non-traded sector 0.373 0.347 –7
    Agriculture 0.822 0.703 –14
    Manufacturing 1.161 0.920 –21
    Market services 0.437 0.413 –5
    Other goods 0.328 0.233 –29
Notes: Table reports the standard deviation of log productivity levels, weighted using country shares in factor inputs.
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Convergence analyses for OECD countries have typically shown that productivity in 
services converges more rapidly than manufacturing productivity; this was the main 
result of Bernard and Jones (1996), and van Biesebroeck (2009) has similar findings. In 
contrast, the study of manufacturing productivity for a much broader set of countries by 
Rodrik (2013) showed clear evidence of convergence. The results in Table 22.2 suggest 
that the convergence of productivity in services in OECD countries is specific to that 
group of countries or to the time period, rather than a more general result.  The sizable 
productivity dispersion in agriculture is consistent with the broader literature (e.g., 
Caselli 2005) and the relative lack of convergence in this sector shows that this large 
dispersion is a persistent factor.
22.3.4. Summing Up
Compared with the earlier analysis of the transatlantic growth gap, which came in a line 
of studies of industry productivity growth, this industry perspective on productivity 
convergence is a much less well-trodden path. As before, the analysis here plays, in 
part, a diagnostic role: Which industries are driving aggregate productivity 
convergence in this sample of countries? However, by confirming the result of Rodrik 
(2013) that manufacturing plays an important role in aggregate convergence, this 
analysis increases support for policies that aim to strengthen the role of manufacturing in 
the economy.
22.4. Determinants of Productivity Growth and 
Convergence
Given an increased understanding of the role of different sectors in aggregate 
convergence, it is useful to find potential determinants of productivity growth and, 
ideally, to better understand why convergence is stronger in some sectors and industries 
than in others. The differences in convergence shown in Table 22.2 are magnified when 
analyzing individual industries or countries. In the median industry, productivity 
dispersion decreased by 21%, similar to the market economy rate, but productivity 
dispersion in the textiles and wearing apparel industry decreased by 58%, while 
productivity dispersion in air transport increased by 24%. Indeed, 6 out of 30 industries 
showed divergence rather than convergence. Also, countries that show larger increases 
in their aggregate relative productivity levels tend to have more industries with 
increasing productivity levels, but the correlation is low at 0.09. This raises the question 
of what could be driving these differences.
To answer this question, I use the following general model used broadly in the 
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(22.22)
In this equation, productivity growth for industry  in country  from year  to year  is 
explained using the proximity to the productivity frontier—the productivity level in 
country  relative to the productivity level of the country with the highest productivity 
level at , explanatory variable  and an interaction between  and the proximity to the 
productivity frontier.  In addition, a full set of country-industry dummies and year 
dummies is included. We would expect a negative coefficient for , since a greater 
proximity to the productivity frontier implies fewer opportunities to achieve productivity 
growth by imitating frontier technologies.
The main interest is in coefficient . If this coefficient is significantly different from zero, 
it implies that variable  has a different effect on productivity growth depending on the 
proximity to the productivity frontier. So, for example, Griffith et al. (2004) find that in 
countries that are closer to the frontier, research and development (R&D) spending 
contributes less to productivity growth, indicating that R&D spending helps both 
innovation (pushing out the frontier) and imitation (catching up to the frontier).
Table 22.3 Potential Determinants of Productivity Growth





The share of university-educated 






Industry imports of intermediate 
inputs of chemicals, machinery, 
electronics, and transport 
equipment as a share of industry 
gross output
+ (Keller, 2004) WIOD
R&D Business enterprise research and 
development expenditure as a 
share of industry gross output




FDI Stock of inward foreign direct 
investment as a share of gross 
output
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Note: WIOD, see www.wiod.org; INDICSER, see www.indicser.com. The (hypothesized) 
effect on convergence is positive if a higher value would lead to faster growth in 
industries that are farther from the frontier (or slower growth in industries close to the 
frontier).
Table 22.3 defines and describes the set of -variables that are considered in the analysis. 
The first is the share of hours worked by high-skilled workers which, according to 
Vandenbussche et al. (2006), should contribute positively to productivity growth only in 
settings of close proximity to the frontier since more high-skilled workers would stimulate 
the rate of innovation.  The second is the share of high-tech imports. As the survey of 
Keller (2004) discusses, imports of more advanced inputs are an important source of 
technology transfer, so these imports would be expected to have a greater impact on 
productivity growth for industries that are farther from the productivity frontier.  Note 
that “high-tech” uses the OECD definition of high and medium-high technology 
industries. The third variable is R&D, which according to Griffith et al. (2004) would have 
a greater impact in industries farther from the productivity frontier since R&D helps both 
innovation and imitation. The fourth variable is foreign direct investment (FDI), which—
again—following Keller (2004) could be a source of foreign technology and thus help 
growth in industries more distant from the frontier.  The final variable is the Lerner 
index, or price-cost margin, where a higher Lerner index implies less intensive 
competition. As discussed in Aghion et al. (2014), fiercer competition (so a lower Lerner 
index) would be particularly beneficial for industries close to the frontier, as those 
industries rely more on innovation for growth and (unless competition turns too cut-
throat) competition is beneficial for growth.
Given these predictions, equation (22.11) can be estimated for each of the variables of 
interest. As indicated in the equation, the regressions include dummies for each 
country/industry pair to account for unobserved heterogeneity and year dummies to 
account for common shocks. In addition, I use two further lags of the explanatory 
variables (so at  and ) as instruments in a two-step Generalized Method of Moments 
procedure to reduce endogeneity concerns. Though more truly exogenous variables, such 
as the introduction of the European Single Market Program exploited by Griffith et al. 
(2010), would be preferable, these are typically hard to find. Finally, standard errors are 
clustered by country-industry pair to allow for correlation of errors within each cross-
section.
Table 22.4 shows the results of the analysis. The first row shows industries that are closer 
to the productivity frontier grow less rapidly, though in the more limited samples for R&D 
(mostly manufacturing and omitting some emerging economies) and FDI (omitting some 
emerging economies) these are less significant. In the final column, the coefficient is not 
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after 2002. Turning to the explanatory variables, the table shows that high-tech imports, 
R&D, and FDI have a significant positive effect on productivity growth. This is a useful 
confirmation of the literature in these areas. Furthermore, given that high-tech imports 
and R&D are more important in manufacturing, and even more so in ICT 
manufacturing, these factors will clearly be important, whether in trying to close the 
transatlantic growth gap (Ortega-Argilés, 2012) or more broadly. However, these effects 
do not vary depending on the proximity to the productivity frontier. In fact, none of the 
interaction coefficients is significantly different from zero, thus failing to contribute to 
our understanding of why some industries show faster convergence than others.
(p. 744) 
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Table 22.4 Explaining Productivity Growth and Convergence: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High-Skilled High-Tech M R&D FDI Lerner
Proximity to the 
frontier
–0.0279 –0.0334 –0.0174 –0.0185 0.0369
(0.00765) (0.00755) (0.00957) (0.0108) (0.0310)
Explanatory 
variable
–0.00123 0.162 0.852 0.00259 –0.101
(0.0386) (0.0582) (0.329) (0.00103) (0.201)
Interaction –0.0276 0.0663 –0.478 –0.00283 –0.279
(0.0338) (0.0430) (0.395) (0.00254) (0.216)
Observations 13,435 13,435 5,676 4,398 1,955
Overid. 
restrictions
0.727 0.404 0.129 0.197 0.0482
*** *** * *
*** *** **
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Notes: Each column represents a separate regression explaining productivity growth using the proximity to the productivity frontier, 
the explanatory variable that is identified in the column header and an interaction between the proximity to the frontier and the 
explanatory variable; see also equation (22.8) for the specification and Table 22.3 for definitions of the explanatory variables. Each 
regression includes country-industry dummies and year dummies and two lagged values of the independent variables are used as 
instruments in a two-step GMM procedure. Standard errors, clustered by country-industry pair, are in parentheses. “Overid. 
restrictions” gives the p-value of the Hansen J statistic on the overidentifying restrictions of all instruments.
( ) p < 0.01,
( ) p < 0.05,
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If the results had shown that a particular variable had a stronger effect on productivity 
growth for industries farther from the frontier, this would have been clear evidence that 
this variable enhances the rate of convergence. A more indirect way would be if that 
variable has a direct effect on productivity growth and takes on higher values in 
industries farther from the frontier. The high-tech import share is negatively correlated 
with the proximity to the frontier but at , the relationship is weak. In contrast, R&D 
intensity is positively correlated with proximity to the frontier and, at , this 
relationship is somewhat stronger. So, if anything, the high-tech import share is a force of 
convergence, while R&D would lead to divergence. However, it is unclear whether these 
correlations have systematic drivers or are a coincidence.
To establish the robustness of the results in Table 22.4, I have considered that the 
industry proximity to the frontier could be measured with error and that, due to the 
persistence in this variable, this is not adequately addressed by using lagged values of 
industry proximity. In the first sensitivity analysis, I therefore use two lagged values of 
the aggregate proximity to the productivity frontier as instruments for industry proximity 
to the frontier. These are clearly weaker instruments, as indicated by first-stage -
statistics, and the pattern of results is the same.
In the second sensitivity analysis, I run the regressions for major sectors (i.e., subsets of 
industries, rather than all industries together). Specifically, I run regressions for 
manufacturing, market services and other goods (including agriculture, as well as mining, 
utilities, and construction). This provides some evidence that the impact of FDI varies 
with proximity to the frontier, but it is unclear why FDI would have a stronger effect on 
productivity growth when an industry is close to the productivity frontier in 
manufacturing and other goods production, but a weaker effect in market services.
22.4.1. Summing Up
The aim of this section was to establish why some industries show more rapid growth and 
convergence than others by testing whether a variety of variables have an effect on 
productivity growth and whether this effect differs in industries that are more distant 
from the productivity frontier. While some variables—R&D, FDI, and high-tech imports 
intensity—were indeed significantly related to productivity growth, others—high-skilled 
workers and competition—were not. More important, none of the variables showed a 
significantly different effect on productivity growth depending on the proximity to the 
productivity frontier.
So where should one look to better understand productivity convergence? It 
could be that the specification chosen here is not appropriate; for instance, it could be 
that learning takes place in proportion to actual trade or investment between specific 
countries (e.g., Keller 2004) instead of a common rate of learning from the frontier 
industry. Beyond that, a first set of alternative candidates are sector- or industry-specific 
regulations, such as import tariffs and other trade restrictions (e.g., Lileeva and Trefler 
(p. 745) 
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2010) or barriers to entry (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003). Other candidates are macro-
level variables whose effects differ across industries, such as financial development 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998), infrastructure (Fernald 1999), or labor market institutions 
(Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn 2009). A third possibility would be that a variable 
considered here has a different effect depending on some other variable that is related to, 
but not perfectly correlated with, (industry) productivity. For example, Alfaro et al. (2010)
find that FDI has a larger effect on productivity in countries with a greater level of 
financial development.
22.5. Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter started with the question in which settings, industry-level productivity 
analysis has added value in the face of growing body of firm-level studies and academic 
and policy interest in economy-wide results. The aim of the three illustrations presented 
in this chapter has been to showcase not only some of strengths, but also the limitations, 
of industry-level productivity analysis. In terms of strengths, there is a clear role for 
industry-level analysis in diagnosing why overall (productivity) growth is faster in some 
countries than in others. As shown in the discussion of the transatlantic productivity 
growth, one may find that overall productivity growth is faster in one country than in 
another, but this can be for a multitude of reasons. And since firm-level analysis is 
typically not able to cover a considerable number of countries in a single study and 
because firm-level analysis typically does not cover all areas of the economy, industry-
level analysis is the next best thing. In the case of productivity growth differences 
between the European Union and the United States, this showed that the United States 
gets most of its growth advantage for more rapid growth in the ICT production sector, but 
also that the productivity growth benefits from ICT use in the United States are less 
impressive or even absent compared to earlier vintages of the data. The other result is 
that distribution and trade is a sector where the European Union lags behind. This is an 
area where EU policy to strengthen the internal market may play an important role, as 
unified distribution systems and fewer restrictions on cross-border activity could lead to 
higher productivity. Though this is speculative, such a result can focus the attention of 
researchers and policymakers.
Similarly, in the broader cross-country setting, I strengthened the finding of Rodrik 
(2013) that convergence in manufacturing is a powerful force. My analysis has shown that 
this sector has made a clear contribution to the overall convergence of productivity 
among 38 major emerging and advanced economies. Finally, the analysis of the 
determinants of productivity growth has shown (again) the importance of R&D, FDI, and 
high-tech imports in fostering productivity growth. However, these play no systematic 
role in helping or hindering the pace of convergence. This means there is still a clear role 
for systematic industry-level analysis to better understand why, for example, 
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manufacturing productivity converges and what governments may do to speed this 
process along.
On the limitations side, the analysis of productivity growth in the European Union and the 
United States has shown how some growth differences have not proven robust to 
changing times and measurement practices. Especially in the area of financial and 
business services, it has long been known that measurement of prices, and thus 
productivity, is challenging. Furthermore, cross-country differences in measurement can 
confound cross-country comparisons. This can be a reason to stay away from such sectors 
in research, but the fact that these services industries represent a large and growing part 
of economic activity should, in my view, be a spur to improve our state of knowledge and 
measurement.
So what may be learned from future industry-level research, and how? Especially for 
understanding growth in services industries, the industry level remains a relevant 
platform—judging in part by the absence of much firm-level research in this area. 
Furthermore, this is also the area where some of the newer “sources of growth” may 
originate, as the source of “intangible assets,” such as new financial products, brand 
equity, and organization capital (Corrado and Hulten 2010). Understanding whether and 
how such assets contribute to growth requires a better understanding of these activities 
and how innovation takes place in, for example, management consulting. Beyond that, 
more careful consideration of how the regulatory environment has an impact on different 
industries in different countries remains important, especially in relation to policymakers.
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Notes:
(1.) Though this bias is weaker than it used to be; see, for example, Foster, Haltiwanger, 
and Krizan (2006) with a micro-level perspective on productivity in retail trade; 
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) on farm size and productivity; or Chandra, 
Finkelstein, Sacarny, and Syverson (2016) on productivity dispersion in hospitals.
(2.) The work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 
(2013) are notable exceptions.
(3.) Linked employer-employee data, as used in, e.g., Utar (2014), are an important 
exception.
(4.) See also Ortega-Argilés (2012) for a survey on the transatlantic productivity (growth) 
gap.
(5.) To be precise, this refers to changes in the pace of total factor productivity growth; 
Stiroh (2002) had shown a similar result for labor productivity growth in ICT-intensive 
industries. See also Chapter 3 of this volume for additional analyses of US data.
(6.) See, e.g., Inklaar et al. (2008) or Inklaar and Wang (2011) specifically on measuring 
real output of banks.
(7.) The second and third application draw heavily on Inklaar (2015).
(8.) Though even when these conditions are not satisfied, aggregate TFP growth can be 
meaningful in tracking consumer welfare; see Basu, Pascali, Schiantarelli, and Servén 
(2014).
(9.) Data on the skill composition of the workforce can be typically be collected from 
household surveys, while a breakdown of industry investment by type of asset can be 
available either from detailed tabulations by statistical agencies or estimates by 
researchers based on additional surveys.
(10.) See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) and Timmer, Inklaar, O’Mahony, and van Ark 
(2010) for a detailed description of the data, and see www.euklems.net for the data.
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(11.) And even within the ICT production sector, the share of ICT manufacturing and ICT 
services are comparable, though in the United States the semiconductor industry is much 
more important and concentrated in products that have generated most TFP growth since 
1995.
(12.) In the March 2007 version of the EU KLEMS database, the finance and business 
services industry showed an annual average TFP growth of 0.9 percent between 1995 and 
2004. These numbers are from the SIC-based data set; the data set based off the newer 
NAICS industry classification system showed growth of 0.5 % for the finance and 
business services industry. In the March 2008 release, growth for the 1995–2004 period 
had declined to –0.2%. The data in the March 2013 release, used here, show growth for 
the 1995–2004 period of –0.7%. These revisions are primarily due to differences in value-
added growth in more recent vintages of the GDP-by-industry accounts of the US Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.
(13.) See, e.g., Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), Vollrath (2009), Herrendorf and 
Valentinyi (2012), Lagakos and Waugh (2013), and Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) on 
industry productivity differences; on structural change, see, e.g., Duarte and Restuccia 
(2010), McMillan and Rodrik (2011), and Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014).
(14.) See, e.g., Bernard and Jones (1996), Inklaar and Timmer (2009), and van 
Biesebroeck (2009) on industry-level convergence across OECD countries. See, e.g., 
Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), Vollrath (2009), and Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014)
on the role of agricultural productivity; and see Rodrik (2013) on manufacturing.
(15.) If  , then net output  is an output and  denotes the production of this 
commodity; if  , then net output  is an intermediate input and  denotes the negative 
of the amount of this input that is used by the production unit.
(16.) Assuming that  so that the data are consistent with the constant returns to 
scale assumption required for implementing the Diewert-Morrison methodology.
(17.) Note that equations (22.12) and (22.13) imply that  and  .
(18.) Note that our normalizations will imply that  .
(19.) Index number methods for computing productivity go back to Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967).
(20.) 
(21.) “World” productivity here means the productivity of the aggregate of the 
productivity levels of the  countries in the sample for each time period .
(22.) Capital compensation is determined as value added minus labor compensation. 
Aggregate compensation and employment data from PWT are used to extrapolate data 
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from the final year covered in the Socio-Economic Accounts to 2011; note that this 
extrapolation is only used to update cost shares, not for estimating industry productivity 
growth.
(23.) See World Bank (2008) for the description of the 2005 survey and results, and World 
Bank (2014) for the 2011 results.
(24.) See Inklaar and Timmer (2014) for more details on the mapping procedure and the 
adjustment for taxes and distribution margins.
(25.) Studies using these data are, e.g., Caselli (2005), Vollrath (2009), and Restuccia et 
al. (2008).
(26.) See, e.g., Inklaar et al. (2008) on diverging productivity growth patterns in market 
services across Europe and the United States after 1995.
(27.) See also, e.g., Inklaar et al. (2008) and McMorrow et al. (2010) for applications of 
this model to the setting of industry productivity growth in Europe.
(28.) In contrast to the “transatlantic growth gap” section, industry productivity growth 
here is (1) computed based on gross output rather than value added; and (2) relies on 
data from the WIOD’s Socio-Economic Accounts (SEA), rather than EU KLEMS, to 
increase country coverage. The main difference between these two sources is that the 
SEA capital input variable is not based on the capital services concept, whereby assets 
with different marginal costs are weighted differently, but rather are based on a capital 
stock concept.
(29.) The work by Ang et al. (2011) shows that the results of Vandenbussche et al. (2006)
are relevant not only for high-income but also for middle-income countries.
(30.) See also Cameron, Proudman, and Redding (2005).
(31.) See also Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2010), Bloom, Sadun, and van 
Reenen (2012), and Cipollina, Giovannetti, Pietrovit, and Pozzolo (2012) with various 
perspectives on the role of FDI for productivity.
(32.) See also Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2010) for an industry-level analysis.
Robert Inklaar
Robert Inklaar, University of Groningen
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